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Abstract
The escalating integration of network-enabled
medical devices raises concerns for both
practitioners and academics in terms of introducing
new vulnerabilities and attack vectors. This prompts
the idea that combining medical device data, security
vulnerability enumerations, and attack-modeling data
into a single database could enable security analysts
to proactively identify potential security weaknesses
in medical devices and formulate appropriate
mitigation and remediation plans. This study
introduces a novel extension to a relational database
risk assessment framework by using the open-source
tool OVAL to capture device states and compare
them to security advisories that warn of threats and
vulnerabilities, and where threats and vulnerabilities
exist provide mitigation recommendations. The
contribution of this research is a proof of concept
evaluation that demonstrates the integration of OVAL
and CAPEC attack patterns for analysis using a
database-driven risk assessment framework.

1. Introduction
The escalating integration of technology into the
healthcare sector enables new and innovative ways
for medical personnel to interact with patients,
capture additional data, and enhance healthcare
delivery. It is being argued that technological
advancements such as robotic surgeries, implantable
cardiac devices, physiological monitors, and Internet
of Things (IoT) devices generate additional data that
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are valuable to medical professionals, ultimately
leading to big data analysis opportunities while
concurrently inspiring evolution to an overall
pervasive healthcare environment [1-3]. In addition
to the benefits, technology exposes healthcare to the
risks that are inherent to digital settings, which
fosters an environment that is conducive to
adversarial cyberattacks [4-6]. These concerns are
being raised by practitioners [7], the government [8],
and academics [6, 9-15] for medical equipment and
any devices that communicate with this equipment.
As with any network-enabled device, medical
devices are susceptible to cyber threats, including
ransomware, data breaches, distributed denial of
service attacks (DDoS), insider threats, and many
more. Certain threats may allow attackers to gain
access to patient data and/or alter the functionality of
a device while connected to a patient. A 2019 survey
reveals that healthcare executives see medical device
security as one of the top five risks they face and that
they lack effective strategies to address their concerns
[16]. Support for this stance is visible in a recent
article describing how a series of widely used
infusion pump-linked workstations contain security
flaws [17]. This environment provides the impetus
for this research and exploration into the use of an
open-source vulnerability scanner known as Open
Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) [18] to
scan devices connected to medical devices and
identify community standard vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities are then linked to attack patterns in
MITRE Corporation’s Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) framework
[19] to identify how an attacker could leverage these
vulnerabilities as well as identify how to mitigate
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identified threats. The study presented in this paper is
part of an MSc Thesis [20] that integrates OVAL and
CAPEC into a Threat-Vulnerability-Asset risk
framework known as MedDevRisk [11, 12]. The
contribution of this research is a proof of concept
evaluation that demonstrates the integration of
OVAL and CAPEC for analysis using a databasedriven risk assessment framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 provides background on key
cybersecurity concepts and standards; Section 3
provides an overview of the case-study methodology
performed to evaluate integration of new concepts
such as attack models, OVAL assessments, and risk
using real-world data; Section 4 details results and
analysis from the study. Finally, section 5
summarizes the work and provides recommendations
for future work.

2. Background
Previous academic research focusing on the risk
assessment of networked medical devices led to the
production of a database-driven risk assessment
framework called MedDevRisk [11], illustrated in
Figure 1. MedDevRisk utilizes constructs such as
STRIDE [21] and Threat Vulnerability Asset (TVA)
[22, 23] in schema relationships that connect
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [24]
risk assessment criteria and Common Vulnerability
and Exposures (CVE) [25] incident reports.
MedDevRisk schema is implemented in a relational
database management system (RDBMS). Through
the use of Structured Query Language (SQL),
MedDevRisk can produce a risk assessment of
medical devices stored in the database targeted at
both low-and-high-level managers. This research
extends the original data sources and data
relationships by integrating OVAL reporting [18]
[12] and CAPEC attack patterns [19].

Figure 1. MedDevRisk Extensions [11]
STRIDE [26] is a threat model that classifies
threats into six attack vectors, which include

Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information
Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of
Privilege. TVA [22, 23, 27] is another threat
framework utilized by MedDevRisk to establish a
relationship between the assets stored in the database,
identified threats, and vulnerabilities. MedDevRisk
uses CVEs [25] to link public vulnerability
classifications to assets and uses CVSS [24] to assign
a numerical risk value to identified vulnerabilities.

2.1 OVAL
OVAL [12] is an open international community
standard for the assessment and reporting of the
machine state of a computer. It includes an XML
language for expressing machine state and reference
implementations and repositories of information
written in the OVAL XML language. OVAL
provides for the representation of system
configuration states for testing and evaluation. Figure
2 provides an overview of the OVAL process [18],
illustrating how OVAL definitions are paired against
specific system characteristics to generate analysis
and results.

Figure 2. OVAL Process [18]
The OVAL language has three core schema types:
definitions, system characteristics, and results.
Definition schemas define systems in two areas:
security advisories that warn of threats and
vulnerabilities, and government agency best practice
policies for system security. The definition schemas
are structured to specify the configuration
information that is to be collected from an individual
system in order to compare it to a definition. The
OVAL process is a comparison of an OVAL
definition to the system characteristics which yields
an OVAL result that follows the results schema
format and identifies whether the system is
vulnerable or not vulnerable. OVAL identifies system
vulnerabilities through the application of Common
Vulnerability Enumerations (CVEs) [25] and
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Common Platform Enumerations (CPE) [28], which
is now a NIST standard.

2.2 CAPEC
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (CAPEC) [19] attack framework was
created by MITRE Corporation to identify an
adversarial viewpoint of a system weakness. An
attacker’s viewpoint is perceived by identifying the
skill level needed to pull off an attack, attack patterns
used to gain access to weaknesses, and the attack
steps that are taken to exploit weaknesses. CAPEC
also identifies mitigation strategies for these attack
patterns. CAPEC not only provides an attacker’s
viewpoint of a weakness but also includes security
tactics to combat an attack.
CAPEC delineates attack patterns into two highlevel abstractions, which are domains of attack and
mechanisms of attack [19]. For example, CAPEC
documents the classic buffer overflow exploit as
pattern 100 (Overflow Buffers), which represents
both a software-based attack (its domain) as well as
an example of manipulating data structures (its
mechanism). As with a typical pattern, CAPEC
pattern 100 provides: 1) a description, 2) likelihood
of attack (high), 3) typical severity (very high), 4)
relationships to other CAPEC items, 5) an execution
flow detailing exploration, experimentation, and
exploitation, 6) prerequisites for the attack (for
example: ‘targeted software inadequately performs
bounds-checking’), 7) skills required, 8) resources
required, 9) indicators, 10) consequence and 11)
mitigations [19]. Each CAPEC pattern is further tied
to one or more related CWE weaknesses [29], which
provides an even greater amount of documented
examples and mitigations.

3. Methodology
This research explores the use of OVAL to
identify device-specific and community classified
vulnerabilities in networked medical devices.
CAPEC is used to provide an adversarial viewpoint
of identified vulnerabilities along with community
provided mitigation techniques to combat an attack.
Expanding the functionality of MedDevRisk to
incorporate OVAL and CAPEC, this research
conducts a case study as defined by Oates [30] on
devices used in an academic medical setting. The
following tasks were completed to achieve this
integration:

1. Device Data Collection: OVAL was executed on
four devices provided by the Human Simulation
Unit at the University of South Alabama
2. Framework Data Collection: XML files
containing CVE and CAPEC data were used to
import framework data into MedDevRisk
3. Schema Expansion: Modified a peer-reviewed
MedDevRisk schema to incorporate OVAL and
CAPEC as well as eliminate normalization issues
4. Data Entry: Python scripts were used to import
gathered data to reduce errors introduced by
human interaction with MedDevRisk
5. Query Configuration: Queries were created to
highlight new framework functionalities
6. Result Reports: Queries were executed and
results analyzed

3.1 Device Data Collection
Before modifying the peer-reviewed database
schema for MedDevRisk [12], a solid understanding
of the data produced by OVAL is needed. This
knowledge was gained through the help of a technical
specialist employed in the Simulation Unit at the
University of South Alabama. This specialist
executed OVAL on four Apple Mac OS devices
connected to medical equipment. This collection
process corresponds to steps 1-5 of the OVAL
process described in Figure 2. A tool called OVAL
Interpreter (version 5.10.1.7) was installed on each
case-study computer in the Simulation Unit and used
to conduct a comparison between the OVAL
Definitions and System Characteristics files. The
operating systems on the case study machines
included Apple macOS X Mavericks versions 10.9.2
and 10.9.5 and macOS Sierra version 10.12. Four
OVAL results files were produced from this
comparison. The following data were provided in
each Result file: ‘OVAL ID’, ‘Result’, ‘Class’,
‘Reference ID’ and ‘Title’.
The ‘OVAL ID’ specifies the specific OVAL
definition that was tested. The ‘Result’ data specifies
if the system being evaluated was compliant or
incompliant with a certain ‘OVAL ID’. ‘Class’ data
categorizes the specific definition into the categories
of vulnerability, inventory, miscellaneous, patch, or
compliance. This research only utilizes definitions
that are in the vulnerability category. ‘Reference ID’
identifies a specific CVE or CPE ID connected to a
specific ‘OVAL ID’. ‘Title’ provides a description of
the ‘OVAL ID’.

3.2 Framework Data Collection
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MITRE, a Federally Funded Research Center,
provides XML files containing data relevant to CVE
and CAPEC definitions. These files were used in a
Python script that extrapolated the XML file data
collected from case-study machines and imported the
data into corresponding tables in MedDevRisk. The
data gathered includes: CAPEC ID, CAPEC Name,
Description, Attack Steps, Attack Techniques,
Mitigation Strategies, CWE ID, CVE ID, CVE
Description, Impact Score, Attack Vector, Attack
Complexity, Confidentiality, Availability, Integrity
and CWE ID.
The OVAL results gathered from the case study
machines were linked to CVE records and CAPEC
records. Each OVAL record contains a reference to a
CVE, which helps us gain more information on the
vulnerability from the National Vulnerability
Database. Since CVE records contain references to
CWEs, OVAL results can be tied to specific CAPEC
records. Connecting these three frameworks allows
for a holistic understanding of a vulnerability found
in a medical device for both upper management and
device security specialists. Figure 3 shows two new
tables (tblOval and tblCAPEC) that were required to
support integration into the MedDevRisk relational
database and provide connecting points using CVE
and CWE identifiers: required schema expansion of
MedDevRisk is discussed next.

Figure 3. Key Schema Interactions

3.3 Schema Expansion
This research expands the original MedDevRisk
framework by Seale et al. [11]. The author’s database
schema provides a peer-reviewed starting point for
potential integration of new concepts such as attack
patterns (CAPEC), real-time vulnerability assessment
(OVAL), and continued use of standard frameworks
such as CVE and CWE. Figure 4 shows the original
schema, and Figure 5 shows the adapted version
produced to support this case study. The original
tables were either maintained (seen as brown in
Figure 5) or modified (seen as green in Figure 5), and
new tables and relationships were required (seen as
yellow in Figure 5). Maintained tables with original
intent include Cause, Control, ControlType, Threat

Figure 4. Original MedDevRisk Schema [15]
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Figure 5. Revised MedDevRisk Schema

Action, ThreatCategory, VulnerabilityType, and
VulnerabilityClass. The Control table is used to
identify potential mitigation strategies for identified
vulnerabilities that either do not have a corresponding
CVE or CWE, which means these vulnerabilities do
not have CAPEC values to identify community
standard mitigation strategies. Table ControlType
identifies what type of control the suggested
mitigation is such as whether the control revolves
around ‘Software Security’ or ‘Training and
Awareness’. The ThreatAction table identifies
whether a vulnerability is a threat to disclosing or
manipulating health information through a specific
attack, for example, a man-in-the-middle attack or a
SQL injection attack. Table ThreatCategory groups
specific threat actions together based on whether the
threat will disclose information or manipulate
information. Finally, table VulnerabilityClass
classifies vulnerabilities by identifying to what
technical area the vulnerability relates. For example,
if a vulnerability is identified in a software
application, the VulnerabilityClass would categorize
that vulnerability in the ‘Software’ group.
Schema expansion during the case study also led
to repurposing the Vulnerability table from an
intersection table into a central combiner of data
related to identified vulnerabilities and any related
attributes. A new AssetVulnerability table now links
assets, threats, and controls (mitigations). The
Vulnerability table provides the storage location for
the CVE links (found in the National Vulnerability
Database [31]), the impact score (from community
derived CVSS calculations and the version of CVSS
used to compute it), associated the CWE identifier
(MITRE’s type classification), and the relationship of
the vulnerability to the traditional Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability (CIA) security triad.
The implementation of this case study required
the development and addition of new tables to the
MedDevRisk schema. Table AssetModel contains
information from both tblDevice and tblInventory
from the original schema such as device name, model
number, intended settings, and logging. The table
AssetModel provides general information about an
asset with a primary key that is automatically
populated and incremented with each new record.
The AssetUnit table contains data about an
individual serialized device. The data in this table are
the individual instantiations of models in
tblAssetModel. It contains information such as device
serial number, purchase date, and location. The
primary key for this table is a composite key of the
primary key from tblAssetModel and the device’s
serial number, which forms a one-to-many
relationship. The AssetUnitMedComponents table
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contains the technical data related to an asset such as
the MAC address(es), operating system, firmware,
etc. and has a composite key of the a component ID
that increments when a new component is added and
keys from tblAssetUnit where there is one-to-many
relationship (one unit, many components). The
Manufacturer table contains the company name that
created an asset along with an automated primary key
that increments with the addition of a new record.
To support the analysis and integration of OVAL
data, the OVAL table was created. Attributes such as
device name and device IP connect records to certain
assets and were needed to determine what records
relate to what assets due to the potential of more than
one asset being vulnerable to the same OVAL ID.
Table AssetModel contains an attribute for device IP
to connect it to the OVAL table. DeviceIP would
have been a good attribute to use for a primary key in
tblOVAL; however, device IP addresses could be
considered sensitive information, which means the
use of this data should be restricted. This led to the
creation of an OVALrecord attribute that is
automatically populated and incremented with the
addition of a new record. The OVALID is the record
identifier established by the OVAL community,
which means one OVAL ID can be tied to many
devices, and many devices can be connected to one
OVAL ID. Due to a possible many-to-many
relationship between assets and OVAL records, the
OVAL ID is not used as the primary key. The class
attribute identifies the type of OVAL ID definition.
For purposes of the case study, all OVALrecord
identifiers have a class of ‘Vulnerability’; however,
OVAL can identify other classes such as inventory,
miscellaneous, and patch. The OVALdescription
provides information on the vulnerability tow which
the device could be susceptible. The Attribute
enumerationType is the test result of an OVAL scan,
so the data in this column will be either ‘true’, ‘false’,
or ‘undetermined’. Finally, OVALvulnID is the
CVEID that is connected to that specific OVAL
definition. This record is how the OVAL table
connects to Vulnerability table.
To integrate attack models, the CAPEC table was
created with supporting attributes. The Attribute
attackID is the primary key that is automatically
assigned and incremented when a new record is
added to the table. An automatic primary key was
necessary because some identified vulnerabilities
(CVEs) have more than one corresponding CWE.
One CWE can be connected to multiple CAPEC
records, so the attackID identifies one CAPEC record
that is connected to a specific CWE. This removes
potential many to many relationships between
tblVulnerability and tblCAPEC. The CAPECID

attribute is the identifier created by MITRE that
allows a user to find that specific CAPEC’s
information in their online database. CAPECdesc
delineates the attack that could be conducted when a
device has a specific weakness. Attribute attackSteps
describe the actions an adversary would perform
when exploiting an asset’s weakness while
attackTechniques identifies how an attacker gains
information that enables him/her to complete an
attack such as how they obtain user credentials to
gain access to a system. The mitigation attribute
provides data about how cybersecurity specialists can
prevent a certain attack from occurring.

3.4 Data Entry
Python scripts were used to automatically import
the data gathered from OVAL, CVE, and CAPEC
definitions and to execute the case study execution on
target computers. Python version 3.7 was used to
extrapolate data from the XML files provided by the
OVAL community. Three scripts were created to
transfer the gathered data. One script gathered the
OVAL data listed in section 3.1, and two other scripts
were created to gather the data listed in section 3.2.

3.5 Query Configuration
After importing data into a database derived from
the expanded MedDevRisk schema (seen in Figure
5), existing queries from prior publications [11, 12]
were utilized and adapted based on the extended
schema. New queries were created to support
extended reporting capabilities based on the addition
of CAPEC and OVAL related data.

4. Case Study Analysis
Data from the original MedDevRisk framework
were combined with results of the case study
methodology outlined in Section 3. New data
included CAPEC information and OVAL support
definitions, as well as enhanced CVE and CWE data
from current National Vulnerability Data feeds. An
SQLServer database was used to implement the
expanded MedDevRisk schema (seen in Figure 5) as
well as to store appropriate data and results.
The OVAL data collection aspect of the case
study ran on four Mac devices, running various
versions of the macOS operating system, that are part
of the University of South Alabama Simulation Unit.
The OVAL Intrepreter software was executed on
each case study devices to generate device specfic
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OVAL system characteristics files. The resulting data
was collected, and scripts were executed to populate
appropriate tables in the MedDevRisk database with
OVAL analysis information. Analysis of the case
study data covers the following four aspects: OVAL
data results, enhanced CWE and CVE data results,
and CAPEC integration results, as well as reporting
capabilities, developed and executed as part of the
case study.

4.1 OVAL Data Results
After execution of the OVAL analysis, Python
scripts parsed XML files and mapped data tags to the
OVAL table in the MedDevRisk database (as seen in
Figure 6). As a result, 684 records were imported into
MedDevRisk: 640 records were derived from CVE
relationships, and 44 were derived from CPE
relationships. Each target machine had 167
vulnerability records classified as unknown results,
three classified false, and one vulnerability record
classified true. As Figure 7 illustrates, the relational
correlation to other tables from the OVAL records
allowed identification of vulnerabilities based on
specific applications installed on the four target
machines. The results were as follows: 552
vulnerabilities related to Adobe applications, with
138 being distinct; 120 vulnerabilities were related to
Microsoft applications, with 30 being distinct; and
four vulnerabilities related to a combination of Adobe
and Microsoft products, with one being distinct.
Query execution allowed for the identification of
eight vulnerabilities related to Apple security patches
or file protocols, with two being distinct.

results related to a weakness in a filing protocol on
Mac operating systems 10.6.x through 10.6.4. This
resulted in an ‘unknown’ identification. This should
have returned a false designation since OVAL was
only tested on machines with operating system
versions 10.9.2, 10.9.5 and 10.12. Overall, the case
study illustrated successful integration of OVAL data
into the TVA relational model of MedDevRisk, as
well as verifying that relational queries can be
developed to link real-time/continuous threat
monitoring with traditional threat/vulnerability
mappings.

Figure 7. OVAL Vulnerability Identification

4.2 Enhanced CVE and CWE Data
To provide a current threat and vulnerability
assessment, the case study also included data
integration of National Vulnerability Database data
from 2006 to 2018. This incorporates not only CVEs
identified in the original MedDevRisk research [11]
but also those CVEs that were identified through
OVAL data integration of this case study. The data
refresh resulted in 101,011 records imported into the
extended MedDevRisk database. Of those records,
75,317 contain CWEs, 640 records connected OVAL
and NVD entries (with 160 being distinct), and 544
records connected OVAL, CVE, and CWEs (with
136 being distinct).

4.3 CAPEC Integration
Figure 6. OVAL Integration Tags
The schema adaptation is designed to allow for
the generation of OVAL reports continuously. It is
also designed so that machines can be retested
regularly, and either existing records in the schema
are updated (for example, a required patch is applied
that mitigates a known vulnerability), or new records
are inserted based on new vulnerabilities identified in
system configurations. One of the vulnerability

To integrate open source CAPEC data into
MedDevRisk, Python scripts were created and
executed to parse XML-based CAPEC formats into
the extended schema of the case study. As a result,
1,206 records were imported. Of these records, 957
records had corresponding CWEs, and 249 did not;
933 records had a corresponding mitigation strategy,
and 273 did not; 632 records had execution steps, and
574 did not, and 366 records had associated attack
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techniques, and 840 did not. Figure 8 summarizes the
data. Import scripts were created that would
continuously refresh data already in the database and
automatically create new or update existing CVE
records when CAPEC related data was encountered.
CAPEC data also allows OVAL information to be
linked through various queries to risk assessment,
vulnerability, and mitigation reports.

Figure 8: CAPEC Integration/Data Quality
As part of the case study, 544 imported OVAL
records were identified with corresponding CWEs
already in the database (corresponding to 136 distinct
records). In terms of relating CAPEC to OVAL, the
case study execution revealed that 6,556 records
connect CAPEC to OVAL vulnerabilities total (with
153 being distinct). Of these, 6,052 records have
associated mitigations (with 113 being distinct), and
504 records do not have mitigations (with 40 being
distinct); 5,004 records had corresponding execution
steps (with 72 distinct), and 1,552 records did not
have associated execution steps (with 81 being
distinct); 1,276 records had related attack techniques
(with 30 being distinct), and 5,280 records did not
have attack techniques (with 123 distinct attack
techniques identified). Figure 9 summarizes the
relational mappings identified through the case study.

4.4 Query and Reporting Capability
The case study resulted in the development of
new queries, views, and generated reports through the
MedDevRisk framework. As Table 1 summarizes,
four distinct capabilities were developed: 1) STRIDE
(STR) and TVA-based summary analysis; 2) OVALbased vulnerability reporting; 3) mitigation reporting
and CVE identification, and 4) adversarial viewpoint
reporting. In MedDevRisk, STRIDE values are
determined by Threat Actions (supported by
tblThreatAction), and they are linked to CVE threat
descriptions. In this case study, four threat actions

were used with the CVEs produced by OVAL: 1)
Disclose Health Information by Application-Layer;
2) Manipulate Health Information by ApplicationLayer; 3) Disclose Health Information by Backdoor
Methods, and 4) Manipulate Health Information by
Backdoor Methods.

Figure 9: CAPEC/OVAL Data Relationships
Table 1: Extended MedDevRisk Reporting
Device Name

STR

TVA

OVL

MIT

ADV

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Medical Device ID
Asset Model Descr
Model #

X

CVSS Base Score

X

Vulnerability Descr
Vulnerability Class

X

Impact Score

X
X
X
X

X

Attack Complexity

X

X

X

Attack Vector
CIA

X
X

X

X
X

STRIDE Action

X

STRIDE Motivation

X

Threat Action

X

X

Threat Source
Mitigation

X

X

X
X
X
X

CVE
Device Name
Attack ID
CAPEC ID

X

X

X
X

CAPEC Name

X

CAPEC Descr

X

Attack Steps

X

Attack Techniques

X

From an adversarial view, the case study
demonstrated a proof of concept for potential devices
in medical environments that have known associated
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CVEs. That basic link provides the ability to link the
device to a risk score (CVSS), the attack steps of an
adversary, the attack techniques used, and possible
mitigations. This information forms the basis for
actionable steps for IT personnel and CIOs who
manage critical assets, including medical devices.
Because PCs and computer workstations often
provide soft targets for attackers, the reporting also
allows security decision-makers to take a more
holistic view of all assets that are part of healthcare
environments.

successfully created attack models and mitigation
strategies for vulnerabilities discovered on networked
medical devices or associated connected devices over
a network, MedDevRisk can still be enhanced.

5. Conclusions and Future Work
Several key goals framed the case study and
methodology of this research. These goals included
1) expanding the current CVE data stored in
MedDevRisk through the creation of a new entity in
the relationship model; 2) implementing an attacker’s
point of view by integrating CAPEC attack patterns;
3) performing real-world system evaluation scans on
medical devices and using OVAL to gather data from
produced reports; 4) integrating OVAL data by
creating tables to support relevant OVAL attributes;
and 5) executing a risk assessment case-study using
real-world data. These goals were accomplished
through proof-of-concept development and a case
study implemented in the Simulation Unit at the
University of South Alabama.
The key contributions resulting from the case
study are summarized in Figure 10. By adding OVAL
and CAPEC values and expanding on CVE and CWE
data, the MedDevRisk framework now provides
support to cybersecurity specialists with community
standard vulnerability data, mitigation strategies, and
adversarial tactics for vulnerabilities medical devices
could face. The reports created to evaluate this data
provide upper management with information that can
aid security specialists in creating attack models and
mitigation strategies for networked medical devices.
The case study illustrates the real-world issues
associated with integrating threat and vulnerability
assessment tools into operational medical settings,
which is normally complicated by a lack of physical
access to machines in a healthcare domain. In part,
the issue of access led to a smaller number of
machines chosen for the proof of concept. The case
study also illustrated an inability to connect CVEs to
CAPEC records automatically (due to CWEs not
being assigned in all cases) and also the lack of fully
defined data in the open-source data (summarized in
Figures 8 and 9). It is recognized that missing
framework information causes some of the mitigation
strategies to lack validity. While this research

Figure 10: Key Contributions of Case Study
An interesting area of future work identified by
the study is the need to create OVAL definitions
specifically for medical devices. One main issue that
was found during the evaluation of previous and new
vulnerability data is that only one used CVE was
connected to a networked medical device. In order to
accomplish this goal, researchers need physical
access to devices and the skill set to be able to
correctly evaluate the devices and identify any
hardware or software vulnerabilities. Identification of
vulnerabilities for specific medical devices enhances
the data produced in risk reports as well as
strengthening the healthcare cybersecurity posture.
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